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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA") is a
consumer protection law based upon the Federal Trade Commission Act.' It
is designed to govern consumer protection by prohibiting "unfair methods of
competition, or unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce."2 It is used by the Office of the State
Attorney and the Department of Legal Affairs to prosecute violators, and it
also provides a private cause of action to individuals and businesses.3 This
Act does not contain express language restricting its protection to Florida
residents only.4 Courts in Florida, both federal and state, have addressed
matters involving the application of the FDUTPA to out-of-state and even
international parties.' The issue of the use of the FDUTPA by non-residents
of the state has not been consistently settled as of today and in fact, a recent
decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal may have further compli-
cated the matter.6
The extraterritorial use of this law is an important issue for individuals
and businesses that reside in and out of the State of Florida. The amount of
international and interstate trade that is performed in and involves Florida
makes it important to highlight the history and current status of court opin-
1. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000); FLA. STAT. § 501.201-.213 (2002); David J. Federbush, The
Unexplored Territory of Unfairness in Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act,
73 FLA. B.J. 26, 28 (1999) [hereinafter Federbush 1].
2. § 501.202(2).
3. § 501.203(2), .211(1). The Department of Legal Affairs is headed-up by the Attorney
General of the State of Florida. § 20.11.
4. See § 501.201-.213.
5. See, e.g., Guyana Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Melbourne Int'l Communications, Ltd., 329 F.3d
1241, 1243 (1ith Cir. 2003); Nieman v. Dryclean U.S.A. Franchise Co., 178 F.3d 1126,
1128-29 (11 th Cir. 1999); Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1090, 1093 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Dep't of Legal
Affairs, 761 So. 2d 1256, 1257 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v.
Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Coastal Physician Servs. of
Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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ions to determine the effective scope of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act.
This article provides a summary of the Act by describing its purposes,
types of violations, enforcement power, and available remedies. The perti-
nent state appellate case history is then explored, including a discussion of
two Fourth District Court of Appeal cases, which examine why the court
held it was appropriate for the Act to extend to non-residents of Florida in
one case, while not in the other.7 The court's rationale in each case, and an
analysis of factors to be considered in determining if the FDUTPA would
apply in future cases, is analyzed.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FLORIDA DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR
TRADE PRACTICES ACT
A. Purposes of the Act
As its name suggests, the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act is a Florida Statute intended to provide a means of protection against
unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable trade practices.8 Specifically, the law
states its purposes as:
(1) To simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing con-
sumer protection, unfair methods of competition, and unconscion-
able, deceptive, and unfair trade practices. (2) To protect the con-
suming public and legitimate business enterprises from those who
engage in unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable, de-
ceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce. (3) To make state consumer protection and enforce-
ment consistent with established policies of federal law relating to
consumer protection. 9
By its definition under the FDUTPA, "'[c]onsumer' means an individ-
ual; child, by and through its parent or legal guardian; business; firm; asso-
ciation; joint venture; partnership; estate; trust; business trust; syndicate;
fiduciary; corporation; any commercial entity, however denominated; or any
other group or combination."' 0 Thus, through its definition of "consumer"
7. Id. at 1094 (distinguishing the facts of this case from those in Glassman in support of
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which includes business entities, and by its stated goal of shielding business
enterprises from unfair competition, this statute extends beyond the protec-
tion of the mere individual consumer and into the area of civil antitrust as
well."
B. Violations of the FDUTPA
The FDUTPA is known as a "little FTC act" because it is the State of
Florida's version of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"). 12 As
such, the Florida Legislature intended that "due consideration and great
weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission
and the federal courts" in determining the types of conduct that constitute
violations of the FDUTPA. 13 On its face, the statute prohibits "[u]nfair
methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."' 4 The
Supreme Court of Florida upheld the constitutionality of the FDUTPA, de-
spite its lack of specificity as to the types of conduct that are considered to be
violations, in Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers. 5
The statute allows for, but does not require, the adoption of rules that
specify violating practices by the Department of Legal Affairs. 6 All sub-
stantive rules created by the Department of Legal Affairs must be consistent
with those created by the FTC and the federal courts in their interpretations
of the FTC Act. 7 Supplementing the holding in Rogers, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal held in Department of Legal Affairs v. Father & Son Mov-
ing & Storage, Inc.8 that "a specific rule or regulation is not necessary to the
determination of what constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice."' 9 Subse-
quent to the decision in Father & Son, the Department of Legal Affairs re-
pealed rules that it had previously adopted and cited this case as the justifica-
tion for its repeal.2"
11. Id.; § 501.202(2); see David J. Federbush, FDUTPA for Civil Antitrust: Additional
Conduct, Party, and Geographic Coverage; State Actions for Consumer Restitution, 76 FLA.
B.J. 52, 53 (2002) [hereinafter Federbush Il].
12. Federbush I, supra note 1; 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
13. FLA. STAT. § 501.204(2) (2003).
14. § 501.204(1).
15. 329 So. 2d 257, 267 (Fla. 1976).
16. §§ 501.203(4),.205(1).
17. § 501.205(2).
18. 643 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
19. Id. at 24.
20. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 2-2.001 (2000) (stating "[i]t is neither possible nor neces-
sary to codify every conceivable deceptive and unfair trade practice prohibited by Part 11,
[Vol. 28:3:817
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While the FDUTPA does not contain a list of practices that are consid-
ered to be violations, it does provide some broad guidelines in its definitions:
"Violation of this part" means any violation of this act or the rules
adopted under this act and may be based upon any of the following
as of July 1, 2001: (a) Any rules promulgated pursuant to the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ss. 41 et seq.; (b) The stan-
dards of unfairness and deception set forth and interpreted by the
Federal Trade Commission or the federal courts; (c) Any law, stat-
ute, rule, regulation, or ordinance which proscribes unfair methods
of competition, or unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable acts or
21practices.
The last category of "per se violations" potentially provides wide lati-
tude as a basis for FDUTPA violations, because the statutes, rules, or ordi-
nances breached do not need to contain definite references to the FDUTPA,
but rather, need only prohibit conduct that is deceptive, unfair, or uncon-
scionable.2 The type of practices that the FDUTPA seeks to regulate are
also quite broad, as demonstrated by its definition:
"Trade or commerce" means the advertising, soliciting, providing,
offering, or distributing, whether by sale, rental, or otherwise of
any good or service, or any property, whether tangible or intangi-
ble, or any other article, commodity, or thing of value, wherever
situated. "Trade or commerce" shall include the conduct of any
trade or commerce, however denominated, including any nonprofit
or not-for-profit person or activity.23
Judging by the language used on its face, the intended scope of the
FDUTPA is therefore far-reaching.24
C. Enforcement of the FDUTPA and Allowable Remedies
The Office of the State Attorney and the Department of Legal Affairs
have power to uphold the FDUTPA. 25 The statute reads:
Chapter 501, Florida Statutes." (citation omitted)). The Florida Administrative Code Anno-
tated also states that the repeal does not modify or restrict the application of Chapter 501 of
the Florida Statutes, to deceptive and unfair trade practices. Id.
21. § 501.203(3)(a)-(c).
22. Mark S. Fistos, Per Se Violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act, 76 FLA. B.J. 62, 63-64 (2002).
23. § 501.203(8) (emphasis added).
24. See id.
5
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"[e]nforcing authority" means the office of the state attorney if a
violation of this part occurs in or affects the judicial circuit under
the office's jurisdiction. "Enforcing authority" means the Depart-
ment of Legal Affairs if the violation occurs in or affects more
than one judicial circuit or if the office of the state attorney defers
to the department in writing, or fails to act upon a violation within
90 days after a written complaint has been filed with the state at-
torney. 6
The "enforcing authority" can bring an action against a willful violator
of the Act for a civil penalty of up to $10,000, and may also seek a declara-
tory judgment, enjoin a violator, or pursue actual damages on behalf of con-
sumers or governmental entities.27
A private cause of action is also provided for by the Act.28 The
FDUTPA states "anyone aggrieved by a violation of this part may bring an
action to obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this
part and to enjoin a person who has violated, is violating, or is otherwise
likely to violate this part. ' 29 Additionally, "[i]n any action brought by a per-
son who has suffered a loss as a result of a violation of this part, such person
may recover actual damages, plus attorney's fees and court costs."30 The
relaxed threshold of "anyone aggrieved" allows for the use of the FDUTPA
by business entities for unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable practices of
competitors.3
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION IN PERTINENT CASES
One aspect of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act that
has been debated in the courts is the issue of its extraterritorial application.32
The FDUTPA does not contain express language limiting its reach within the
25. § 501.203(2).
26. Id.
27. § 501.2075; § 501.207(1)(a)-(c).
28. §501.211(1).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. § 501.211(2).
31. See § 501.211 (l); Federbush 11, supra note 11, at 52.
32. See, e.g., Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2003); Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Dep't of Legal Affairs, 761
So. 2d 1256, 1260 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738
So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Coastal Physician Servs. of Broward County,
Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
[Vol. 28:3:817
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State of Florida, as opposed to the Florida Antitrust Act, for example.33
There are various scenarios in which the FDUTPA could potentially apply,
for example: an out-of-state plaintiff (alleged victim) versus an in-state de-
fendant (alleged violator), or an in-state plaintiff (alleged victim) versus an
out-of-state defendant (alleged violator).34 The situation becomes more
complicated when there are plaintiffs from both within and outside the state,
as well as when the violative conduct occurs solely within the state or both
within and outside the state.35 Court decisions have swayed back and forth
between allowing the application of the FDUTPA to cases involving out-of-
state parties and not doing so, because of the need for other states' consumer
protection laws to govern instead.36 A careful review of relevant cases may
shed some light on the factors that the courts have considered when deter-
mining whether or not to allow the application of the FDUTPA to litigation
involving non-resident parties. This Note reviews relevant appellate level
cases that decided the issue of whether the FDUTPA may be used as the ba-
sis of a cause of action by non-resident plaintiffs.
A. FDUTPA Not Applied Extraterritorially in Coastal Physician Services of
Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz
The 1999 case of Coastal Physician Services of Broward County, Inc. v.
Ortiz7 involved a claim by a patient against a physician staffing service for
alleged violations of the FDUTPA incurred in the collection of medical
bills.38 A discovery order was entered by the circuit court, instructing the
physician staffing service to provide documents naming all people to whom
the service sent a certain form bill.39 The staffing service petitioned for a
writ of certiorari, arguing that the information they were required to provide
33. Federbush 11, supra note 11, at 60. Compare § 501.201-.213, with § 542.18 (stating
"[e]very contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in this state is
unlawful.") (emphasis added);.
34. See, e.g., Fendrich v. RBF, L.L.C., 842 So. 2d 1076, 1079 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (out-of-state plaintiffs v. in-state defendants); Execu-Tech Bus. Sys. Inc. v. New Oji
Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 583 (Fla. 2000) (in-state-plaintiffs v. out-of-state defendants).
35. See, e.g., Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1094; Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 437.
36. Compare Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1094 (holding that class certification in Florida was
not appropriate because the alleged wrong took place in all fifty states and therefore, Florida
law would not apply to all claims), with Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 439 (finding that although a
majority of plaintiffs were not residents of Florida, the FDUTPA applied to all members of the
class).
37. 764 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id.
7
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under the discovery request should be limited to Florida residents only.4°
Their initial attempt to limit discovery was unsuccessful; however, on motion
for rehearing, the Fourth District Court of Appeal granted Coastal's petition
for certiorari of the discovery order, limited to the names of those recipients
outside the State of Florida.4 In granting certiorari, the court agreed with the
staffing service that non-Florida residents could not make claims under the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.42 The court concluded
that together with another state law at issue, the FDUTPA is "for the protec-
tion of in-state consumers from either in-state or out-of-state debt collectors.
Other states can protect their own residents, as Florida itself does with regard
to out-of-state collectors. 43
In Ortiz, the Fourth District Court of Appeal was therefore quite limit-
ing in its determination of who can utilize the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act, holding that non-residents of the state were not entitled
to benefit from its protections, but rather, must rely on the laws of their re-
spective states."4 The court's holding may, or may not, still stand, as shall be
discussed below.
45
B. FDUTPA Applied in Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman
The next relevant case at the state appellate level was Renaissance
Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman,46 also decided in 1999. 4' Here, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal upheld a class certification by travelers against a cruise line
for claims of deceptive trade practices under the FDUTPA, even though
many class members were not residents of Florida.48 The conduct in ques-
tion was the collection by the cruise line of a "port charge" which was sup-
plemental to the cost of the cruise itself.49 The alleged deceptive conduct
was the representation by the cruise line that the entire port charges were
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d at 8.
43. Id. (citations omitted).
44. See id.
45. Compare Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Dep't of Legal Affairs,
761 So. 2d 1256, 1262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (characterizing the subsequent Fourth
District Court of Appeal decision in Glassman as a rescission of its previous holding in Ortiz),
with Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1090, 1094 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(clarifying that its holding in Ortiz was not superceded by its holding in Glassman, but rather,
both opinions stand and the cases are distinguishable).
46. 738 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 439.
49. Id. at 437.
[Vol. 28:3:817
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paid to the ports, when actually an amount less than that collected was paid
out and the cruise line kept the difference.50 The plaintiffs commenced an
action for what they deemed to be a deceptive trade practice and sought class
certification of "'[a]ll U.S. residents who traveled upon any vessel owned or
operated by Renaissance on or after April 22, 1992, and paid port charges to
Renaissance in connection with such cruise."' 5'
1. Requirements for Certification of the Class
In order to certify a class, it must meet the requirements of rule 1.220(a)
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:
(1) the members of the class are so numerous that separate joinder
of each member is impracticable, (2) the claim or defense of the
representative party raises questions of law or fact common to the
questions of law or fact raised by the claim or defense of each
member of the class, (3) the claim or defense of the representative
party is typical of the claim or defense of each member of the
class, and (4) the representative party can fairly and adequately
protect and represent the interests of each member of the class.
52
In addition to meeting those elements, a claim can only be maintained
on behalf of the class if,
individual adjudications for proposed class members would be in-
consistent; or the defendant's actions make injunctive or declara-
tory relief as a whole appropriate; or the common questions of law
or fact "predominate over any question of law or fact affecting
only individual members of the class, and class representation is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adju-
dication of the controversy.53
2. Application of Florida Law to All Members of the Class
In Glassman, based on data provided by the cruise line, ninety-two per-
cent of tickets were sold to non-residents of the State of Florida. 4 The cruise
line argued against class certification on the basis of the inapplicability of
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. FLA. R. Cv. P. 1.220(a); Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438.
53. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438 (quoting FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)).
54. Id. at 437.
9
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Florida law to every proposed class member, as so many were non-residents
of Florida who purchased their tickets outside of the state.55 If Florida law
did not pertain to their claims, then the "commonality" and "predominance"
requirements of rules 1.220(a)(2) and (b)(3) would not be met and the class
could not be certified.56
The travelers, however, demonstrated that while not in the majority, still
over 6000 potential class members were residents of the State of Florida.
57
Numerous other factors helped to establish that the use of Florida law for all
claims would be proper: the location of Renaissance's principal place of
business and site of most of its business operations being in Florida; the trav-
eler's ultimate payment being made to the cruise line in Florida; and a forum
selection clause in the terms of each cruise ticket, specifying Broward
County, Florida as having jurisdiction over claims arising out of the ticket
sale.58
Here on appeal, the "significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts" test developed in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts59 was relied upon
by the cruise line as the standard that needed to be met in order "to apply a
state's substantive law to a class action without offending the Due Process or
Full Faith and Credit Clauses. '60 The cruise line contended that "there were
insufficient contacts with Florida to warrant application of Florida law to
apply to the entire class so that common questions of law and fact would not
predominate over individual claims."'" For the reasons mentioned above that
were asserted by the travelers, and other reasons as well, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal found that there were significant contacts with the State of
Florida to warrant the application of its law to claims by the class members,
55. Id.
56. Renaissance Cruise, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(2), (b)(3).
57. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 437.
58. Id. at 438. While the claim under the FDUTPA that was asserted by the class did not
arise under the ticket sale transaction, the presence of the forum selection clause was argued
by the potential class members to be additional justification for applying Florida law, since the
cruise line had chosen to avail itself of the jurisdiction for those disputes which did originate
under the ticket transaction, and so should be held for this action. Id.
59. 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985).
60. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 439 (referencing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818-19). The Court in
Shutts quoted its plurality opinion in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), "for a
State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818;
Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13.
61. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438-39 (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818-19).
[Vol. 28:3:817
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so "[t]here [was] nothing arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair in applying the
law of Florida to all of the members of the class."6
The cruise line asserted two other reasons that class certification was
not proper: based on Florida choice of law standards, Florida substantive
law would not apply; and the statute of limitations varied between states and
thus, it would be unmanageable to apply to individual class members.63
These claims were both denied by the court, which found that the significant
relationship test to determine which state's substantive law applies.' 4 The
test, as outlined in Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co.,65 was met here and
so Florida substantive law applies to all claims.66 With respect to the varying
statutes of limitation issue, the court cited Bates v. Cook, Inc. ,67 in which the
significant relationship test in Bishop was used to determine which state's
statute of limitation applies, and since here that test allowed for the use of
Florida substantive law, Florida's statute of limitation would apply to all
class members as well.
68
One note that becomes important in the later discussion of the Hutson
case, 69 is that in Glassman, the Fourth District Court of Appeal mentioned in
its account of the trial court's opinion that the common injury occurred in
Florida because all cruise payments were made to the cruise line in Florida.70
There was no further discussion of this determination in the Fourth District
Court of Appeal's opinion as it was not specifically an issue raised by
Glassman on appeal.7 In Hutson, the court refers to the place of injury as a
determining factor as to whether the FDUTPA applies to a class action in-
volving non-residents of Florida.1
2
62. Id. at 439. Other factors that the court considered in determining that there were
significant contacts between Florida and the litigation included: the port charges in question
were paid by the cruise line by checks issued from Fort Lauderdale; overages above the port
charges paid out were kept by the cruise line in Fort Lauderdale; the cruise ticket contract and
marketing material were from Broward County, and included the cruise line's Fort Lauderdale
address. Id.
63. Renaissance Cruise, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 439-40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
64. Id. at 439.
65. 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980).
66. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 439.
67. 509 So. 2d 1112, 1114-15 (Fla. 1987).
68. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 440.
69. Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
70. Id. at 438.
71. See id. at 436-40.
72. See Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1094.
11
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3. Conclusion: Application of the FDUTPA to Non-Resident Class
Members
In Glassman, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the Seven-
teenth Judicial Circuit Court's "well-reasoned order., 73 In granting the class
certification, the trial court
concluded that there was sufficient commonality of factual and le-
gal issues and that Florida had sufficient contacts, creating state in-
terest, such that application of Florida law to the entire class was
not arbitrary or unfair. The court noted that Florida has a great in-
terest in protecting people dealing with corporations doing busi-
ness within Florida.74
The affirmation by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of the lower
court's holding, emphasizing the State of Florida's interest in protecting peo-
ple dealing with Florida businesses, demonstrates a shift in the court's ap-
proach to the use of the FDUTPA from that expressed in Ortiz.75 There, the
court characterized the purpose of the Act as being "for the protection of in-
state consumers" in granting certiorari to limit discovery to only residents of
the state because non-residents were not entitled to make claims under the
FDUTPA.76 Here, the state's interest in "protecting people dealing with cor-
porations doing business within Florida" was applicable to the entire class,
Florida residents and non-residents alike, and their claims under the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act were permitted.77
C. FDUTPA Not Applied Extraterritorially in Oc6 Printing Systems
USA, Inc. v. Mailers Data Services, Inc.75
The Second District Court of Appeal decided Ocd in June of 2000.'9
This case was brought by a group of users, brokers, and servicers of high
speed printers against the company that manufactured, sold, and financed the
73. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 437.
74. Renaissance Cruise, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 438 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (describing the 17th Circuit Court's holding of class certification and the application of
Florida law to all claims) (emphasis added).
75. See id. at 437-38. But see Coastal Physician Servs. of Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz,
764 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
76. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d at 8.
77. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438.
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printers.80 The complaint alleged violations of both the FDUTPA and the
Florida Antitrust Act for conduct by the defendants involving their mainte-
nance service, replacement parts, and lease financing.8' The plaintiffs sought
nationwide class certification, which was granted by the lower court and
appealed here.82
In determining whether the FDUTPA would apply to the claims of non-
residents, the Second District Court of Appeal acknowledged the lack of
limiting language in the Act itself, but limited the use of the statute to Florida
residents nonetheless. 83 The sole authority that the court cited for justifica-
tion of its decision was Coastal Physician Services of Broward County, Inc.
v. Ortiz."4 Referring to Ortiz, the Second District said "the court concluded
that the Unfair Trade Act was enacted to protect in-state consumers. 'Other
states can protect their own residents.' We agree that only in-state consum-
ers can pursue a valid claim under the Unfair Trade Act., 85 The court re-
jected cases referred to by the proposed class by distinguishing them because
they were based on common law, rather than statutory law.86 In doing so, the
court stated:
The Plaintiffs point to several cases in which nationwide classes
have been certified to argue that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in certifying such a class. However, in those cases, none
of the plaintiffs pursued claims under a state statutory scheme.
Rather, the plaintiffs alleged claims under common law theories
that could be applied nationwide. In contrast, the applicable stat-
utes in this case limit who can bring an action under the statute. A
nationwide class that allows entities to circumvent the express
statutory language is impermissible. Therefore, the trial court's or-
80. Id. at 1039. At least one of the plaintiffs was a Florida corporation, and at least one
contract between plaintiff and defendant was executed in the State of Florida. Id. at 1037,
1040.
81. Id. at 1039-42.
82. Oc. 760 So. 2d at 1040.
83. Id. at 1042.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Coastal Physician Servs. of Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d 7,
8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted)).
86. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Broin v. Philip
Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Cox v. Shell Oil Co., No.
CIV.A.18844, 1995 WL 775363, at *1 (Tenn. Ch. Nov. 17, 1995)).
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der certifying a nationwide class pursuant to the Unfair Trade Act
must be reversed.
87
The result in Oc, the non-application of the FDUTPA to non-residents,
is in agreement with that of Ortiz, but conflicts with that of Glassman.88
D. FDUTPA Applied in Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v.
Department of Legal Affairs
An important decision regarding the extraterritorial application of the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act was Millennium Commu-
nications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Department of Legal Affairs.89 In this July,
2000 case, Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. ("Millennium"),
a Florida corporation, advertised and marketed a credit card program by mail
and phone to residents solely outside the State of Florida.90 Millennium sent
postcards to consumers with poor credit histories to promote a credit card
program that could assist the consumers in rebuilding positive credit re-
ports.9' The wording on the postcard said: "CONGRATULATIONS!
YOU HAVE BEEN SELECTED TO RECEIVE A CREDIT CARD with an
unsecured credit limit of $4,000 Guaranteed regardless of your past credit
history!" as well as other representations.92 Upon receipt of the postcard,
consumers were instructed to call an "800" number for further information
and were then told they could receive an unsecured credit card with a $4000
credit limit that could be used to charge the purchase of goods from catalogs
which would be provided by the company that issued the credit card.93 After
providing information to the phone representatives, including payment of a
$129 fee that was automatically withdrawn from their checking accounts,
consumers would receive an Advantage credit card which could only be used
to order from catalogs that were subsequently sent with the Advantage credit
card.94 Along with the card and catalogs, consumers were given a list of re-
87. Oc4, 760 So. 2d at 1042 (referencing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 797; Brain, 641 So. 2d at
888; Cox, 1995 WL 775363, at *1).
88. Compare Oce, 760 So. 2d at 1042, and Ortiz, 764 So. 2d at 8, with Renaissance
Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 439-40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
89. 761 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
90. Id. at 1257. Millennium was licensed by a Nevada company, Continental Consumer
Credit Corporation ("Continental"), to "promote Continental's Advantage credit card program
in all states except Florida, Kansas, Wisconsin, and North Carolina." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1258 n.2.
93. Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1258 n.3.
94. Id. at 1258.
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quirements that they had to fulfill in order to become eligible to apply for a
Visa or MasterCard credit card.95 The requirements included the down pay-
ment of fifty percent of the total amount of orders, payment of an additional
eight percent charge on orders for shipping and handling, total charges (ex-
cluding down payments) of at least $500 that are then completely paid for,
and six months of timely payments.96 Once a consumer met these require-
ments, the consumer could then apply for a Visa or MasterCard credit card,
and if approved, the consumer would be required to pay an additional fee,
separate from the $129 fee paid to Millennium for the Advantage credit
card.97
The Department of Legal Affairs alleged that the language in the post-
card was likely to mislead consumers reasonably acting under the circum-
stances to believe that they would be receiving a Visa or MasterCard credit
card, and so the mailing was deceptive and a violation of the FDUTPA.9s
The Department also claimed that representations were expressly or impli-
edly made to consumers who called the "800" number that they would re-
ceive a Visa or MasterCard.99 The complaint also alleged that few, if any,
consumers received a Visa or MasterCard through the program touted by
Millennium, because they did not meet the necessary requirements.' 0 The
Department of Legal Affairs sought injunctive relief, namely to enjoin Mil-
lennium from continuing to engage in the alleged deceptive conduct, civil
penalties of $10,000 for each act or practice found to be a violation of the
FDUTPA, and reimbursement to consumers.' 0'
The trial court found the postcard that Millennium sent out to be decep-
tive and granted the motion of the Department of Legal Affairs for a tempo-
rary injunction to enjoin Millennium from continuing to use it."02 The parties
were also ordered, in consultation with a special master, to create a revised
postcard that would include disclosures and disclaimers to consumers on
what they would and would not receive, as well as other changes that the
court ordered. 03 This revised version of Millennium's postcard was to be
95. Id. at 1258-59.
96. Id. at 1258.
97. Id. at 1259.
98. Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1263.
99. Id. at 1258.
100. Id. at 1259.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1259. The trial court ordered the new postcard to have a
street address, rather than the post office box address previously used, and the "sales pitch
script" was to conform to the newly created postcard. Id.
15
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subject to the approval of the Department of Legal Affairs. °4 Millennium
appealed the trial court's injunctive order.'05
1. Application of the FDUTPA to Conduct Directed to Non-Residents
On appeal, Millennium argued first that the FDUTPA does not apply to
consumers who reside outside of the State of Florida and therefore, the tem-
porary injunction should not have been granted.0 6 Millennium argued in the
alternative that if the FDUTPA does apply to its conduct, the injunctive order
was still improper because its postcard was not deceptive.17 Finally, they
asserted that should the postcard be found deceptive, it was erroneous for the
trial court to have ordered that the Department of Legal Affairs have ap-
proval over the revised postcard because that directive "constituted an im-
proper delegation of judicial authority to the executive branch."'0 8
The Third District Court of Appeal first considered the claim related to
the extraterritorial application of the FDUTPA.'09 To determine the intended
scope of the Act, the court looked to the legislative intent as expressly stated
in the purpose section of the statute, as interpreted by case law, and as ex-
plained in secondary material." 0 The court also took notice of the way that
key terms were defined and the use of certain words throughout the statute,
for example, "'interested party or person' means any person affected by a
violation of this part or any person affected by an order of the enforcing au-
thority."'' . The court also recognized that the statute lacked any expression
of limitation in terms of confining the enforcement power of the Department
of Legal Affairs to only trade conduct that affects Florida residents." 2 The
court stated, "[i]n the absence of any such limiting language, we decline to
construe chapter 501 as limiting the Department's enforcement authority to




106. Id. at 1260.
107. Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1260.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1261 (citing FLA. STAT. § 501.202 (1997); Acosta v. Richter, 671 So. 2d 149,
153 (Fla. 1996); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 609 So. 2d 1315, 1317 (Fla.
1992); Macias v. HBC of Fla., Inc., 694 So. 2d 88, 90 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); David J.
Federbush, The Unclear Scope of Unconscionability in FDUTPA, 74 FLA. B.J. 49, 49 (2000)
[hereinafter Federbush 111]).
111. Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1261 (citing § 501.203(6)).
112. Millenium, 761 So. 2d at 1261.
113. Id. (citing Holly v. Audle, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984); Messmer v. Teacher's
Ins. Co., 588 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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2. Reconciling the Court's Holding with Other Decisions
Millennium referred the court to Coastal Physician Services of Broward
County, Inc. v. Ortiz, discussed above, in which the Fourth District Court of
Appeal granted certiorari to limit discovery to only Florida residents for
claims made under the FDUTPA." 4 In regards to Millennium's citation to
the Fourth District Court of Appeal's opinion in Ortiz, the Third District
Court of Appeal stated:
[w]ith due respect to our sister court, we are not persuaded by this
holding as it applies to FDUTPA because as we have earlier noted,
there are no geographical or residential restrictions contained in
the express language of section 501.202. Moreover, in its later de-
cision of Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436
(Fla. 4th DCA 1999), wherein the same court found that FDUTPA
had applicability to both in-state and out-of-state residents in a
class action, it appears to us that the fourth district has receded,
sub silentio, from its earlier holding in Ortiz.'
In addition to rejecting the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in
Ortiz, the Third District Court of Appeal distinguished decisions from other
state and federal courts that Millennium presented to demonstrate that state
consumer protection statutes were not extended to trade conduct that oc-
curred outside of the state." 6 The reason that the court provided for the dis-
tinction was that the cases that Millennium cited were each based upon a
state consumer protection statute which did contain language limiting its
reach to only conduct within its state."7 The court provided citations to other
cases which held the state consumer protection statutes of Illinois, New
Hampshire, and Ohio were also not restricted to the protection of in-state
residents only." 8
114. Id. at 1261 (citing Coastal Physician Servs. of Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So.
2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
115. Id. at 1261-62 (referring to Ortiz, 764 So. 2d at 8).
116. Id. at 1262 (citing Att'y Gen. of Md. v. Dickson, 717 F. Supp. 1090, 1101 (D. Md.
1989); Bass v. Hendrix, 931 F. Supp. 523, 536 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 542 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1988).
117. Millenium, 761 So. 2d at 1262.
118. Id. at 1262 n.5 (citing Perry v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1370
(M.D. Ala. 1996; Cirone-Shadow v. Union Nissan of Waukegan, No. 94 C 6723, 1995 WL
238680 (N.D. 111. Apr. 20, 1995); Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minebea Co., 918 F. Supp. 491,
504 (D.N.H. 1996); Brown v. Mkt. Dev., Inc., 322 N.E.2d 367, 369 (1974).
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3. Conclusion: Justification for the Protection of Non-Residents by the
FDUTPA
By its holding in Millennium, the Third District Court of Appeal al-
lowed the application of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act to a scenario in which the parties injured by the alleged deceptive trade
practices were solely residents outside of the State of Florida. The court ex-
plained its rationale for allowing the FDUTPA to apply:
[a]s we read FDUTPA, it seeks to prohibit unfair, deceptive and/or
unconscionable practices which have transpired within the territo-
rial boundaries of this state without limitation. Therefore, where
the allegations in this case reflect that the offending conduct oc-
curred entirely within this state, we can discern no legislative in-
tent for the Department to be precluded from taking corrective
measures under FDUTPA even where those persons affected by
the conduct reside outside of the state." 9
It is interesting to note that the court characterized the "offending con-
duct" as having occurred entirely within the State of Florida, without speci-
fying which exact act performed by Millennium was the "offending con-
duct," particularly when you consider the fact that the receipt of the post-
cards by the consumers occurred wholly outside the state. 2° Incidentally,
after determining that the FDUTPA applied to the claims of the non-
residents, the court considered the other claims on appeal in Millennium,
found that the postcard that Millennium sent to the non-resident consumers
was not sufficiently deceptive and therefore reversed the injunction that had
been ordered by the circuit court.' 2'
E. FDUPTA Not Applied in Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.
A more recent case, Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.,'22 was decided by
the Fourth District Court of Appeal in February 2003. Similarly to Glass-
man, one aspect of this case involved whether Florida law applied to the
claims of all potential class members, even those who did not reside within
the state, in order to determine if the requirements of class certification were
met. 23 However, unlike the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in
119. Id. at 1262 (emphasis added).
120. See id.
121. ld. at 1264.
122. 837 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
123. Id. at 1093.
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Glassman, here, the court held that the FDUTPA did not apply to the claims
of non-residents of Florida.1
2 4
The facts of Hutson involve the purchase, by nationwide consumers, of
calcium supplements manufactured by Rexall Sundown, Inc. ("Rexall"), a
company headquartered in Florida.12 5 The alleged deceptive trade practice
arose out of the labeling of two particular products as "Calcium 900" and
"Calcium 1200."' 126 The class representatives allege that Rexall's labeling of
these products and their point of purchase marketing and advertising misled
consumers into erroneously believing that they would obtain 900 and 1200
milligrams of calcium by taking one softgel of each respective product, when
in fact it was necessary to take three softgels of the Calcium 900 to obtain
900 milligrams of calcium, and two softgels of the Calcium 1200, in order to
obtain 1200 milligrams of calcium. 27  Hutson alleges that this deceptive
conduct therefore resulted in the cost of a dose being higher than represented
and the consumers receiving less than the amount of calcium they believed
they were consuming.
2 8
1. Certification of the Class
As in Glassman, rule 1.220(a) and (b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure needed to be met in order to grant class certification.2 9 The trial
court found that "the typicality, adequacy, predominance, superiority, and
manageability requirements" of these rules were not met and therefore, de-
nied Hutson's motion to certify the class. 3 ' The predominance element of
rule 1.220(b) involved a question of whether Florida law applied to the entire
class; it states: "the questions of law or fact common to the claim or defense
of the representative party and the claim or defense of each member of the
class predominate over any question of law or fact affecting only individual
124. Id. at 1094.
125. Id. at 1091. The case opinion does not provide the reason the FDUTPA is used as a
basis for the claims, the business location of Rexall Sundown, Inc., its principal place of busi-
ness, or the state in which it is in incorporated; however, the company maintains a website on
the internet which states that it is "one of South Florida's leading businesses" and that its
headquarters are located in Boca Raton, Florida. See id. at 1090-95; Company Profile of
Rexall Sundown, Inc., available at http://www.rexallsundown.com/pages/locations.aspx (last
visited Apr. 1, 2004).
126. Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1091.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)-(b).
130. Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1091.
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members of the class."'13' If it was determined that the laws of their respec-
tive states would apply to the non-resident class members, rather than Florida
law, then common questions of law would not predominate and the class
could not be certified.'32 The class representatives appealed the decision of
the lower court which found the laws of other states did apply to those non-
resident class members and therefore rejected class certification.'33
2. Hutson in Relation to Glassman, Ortiz, and Oc6
The appellants in Hutson argued that the holding of Glassman, in which
the FDUTPA applied to the claims of non-residents of Florida, applied to
their case as well.'34 The Fourth District Court of Appeal distinguished
Glassman from Hutson on the grounds that sufficient contacts with Florida
existed in Glassman to warrant the application of Florida law to the whole
class and because in Glassman, "the common injury occurred in Florida."'135
The appellants referred the court to the statement by the Third District Court
of Appeal in Millennium which recognized the apparent overruling of Ortiz,
the case now being relied upon by the court. 36 In response, the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal proclaimed their disagreement with their sister court's
assessment of their holding in Glassman as superceding their decision in
Ortiz.'37 The court went on to distinguish Glassman from Ortiz based upon
the location of the claimed injuries.' The court said that the injuries in
Ortiz occurred inside and outside the State of Florida, preventing the use of
Florida law for all claims, and analogized Oc6 in this regard, as well. 39 The
injuries claimed in Glassman, on the other hand, occurred only in Florida,
per the trial court's determination in that case. 40
131. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(3); Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1090, 1092
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
132. Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1093.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1093-94 (citing Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 438-39
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
136. Id. at 1094 (citing Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Dep't of Legal
Affairs, 761 So. 2d 1256, 1262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing Coastal Physician
Servs., Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
137. Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1094.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Ortiz, 764 So. 2d at 8; Oc6 Printing Sys. USA, Inc. v. Mailers Data Servs.,
Inc., 760 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
140. Id. (citing Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438).
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In Hutson, the Fourth District Court of Appeal discussed the extraterri-
torial location of the injuries claimed and resulting non-application of the
FDUTPA:
[h]ere, the alleged deceptive unfair trade practice involved the na-
tionwide sale of products with a misleading label and with mis-
leading point of purchase marketing techniques. The claims as-
serted in the national class action occurred both in the state of
Florida and in 49 other states. The alleged wrong was committed,
and the damage done, at the site of the sale of appellees' products;
that is, in the various states where members of the purported class
made their purchases. We hold that the trial court correctly con-
cluded that common issues of law do not predominate because the
claims of non-resident consumers would require the application of
consumer protection laws from each of the states where the decep-
tive trade practice occurred and the non-resident claimants suf-
fered injury.' 41
3. Hutson Analogized to Stone v. CompuServe Interactive Services, Inc. 1
42
The court cited their decision in Stone as applying similar reasoning to a
similar set of facts. 4 3 There, an attempt was made at class certification for
plaintiffs who alleged breach of contract as a result of not receiving, or not
timely receiving, a rebate offered by CompuServe to purchasers of particular
computers who also selected internet service with CompuServe.14 The class
was not certified by the Circuit Court because of the failure to meet all
needed requirements of Rule 1.220 of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 45 The lower court's decision not to certify the class was affirmed by
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which stated, "Florida has insufficient
contacts with the purported class members of other states to justify the appli-
cation of Florida's contract law to a nationwide class."' 146
In Stone, the Court distinguished the matter from Glassman, because
there, Florida had significant contacts to the case to justify the use of Florida
law. 14 By then applying Florida law, namely, the FDUTPA, "a single statute
141. id.
142. 804 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
143. See id. at 385, 389-90; Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1090, 1094 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
144. Stone, 804 So. 2d at 385.
145. Id. at 387.
146. Id. at 389.
147. Id. (discussing its decision in Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436,
439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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applied to all claims, so there was a predominance of common legal is-
sues."'' 48 In Stone, however, the Court found that the various states repre-
sented by the potential class members would apply varying standards to de-
termine if there was a breach of contract. The difference between the state
laws eliminated the presence of common issues of law that would predomi-
nate in a nationwide class, as required for class certification. 149 Though the
Fourth District Court of Appeal referred to Stone in its Hutson decision, per-
haps an important difference between Hutson and Stone is that in Hutson, all
claims were based upon the FDUTPA as opposed to Stone, where the claims
were made for breach of contract, a common law basis. 50 According to Flor-
ida's conflict of law rules, the determination of a breach of contract is gov-
erned by the state's law where the contract was made or performed. 5 '
Therefore, in Stone, the use of each consumer's state law was appropriate,
and the differences between the state laws eliminated the presence of com-
mon issues of law that would predominate and allow class certification.'
The FDUTPA, however, has been applied to cases where non-residents of
the state of Florida commenced action against Florida companies and it was
determined that the "offending conduct" or the "common injury" occurred
within the state.5 3 The court in Hutson decided that the "common injury"
had not occurred within the State, because its determination of the place of
injury was at the place of purchase in each of the fifty states."'
4. Significance of the Court's Decision
Hutson is important for its clarification by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal that it did not intend for its holding in Glassman (allowing the
FDUTPA to apply to claims made by non-residents of Florida), to supercede
its earlier decision in Ortiz, where discovery was limited to the alleged
FDUTPA violations of Florida residents only.' Additionally, it raises is-
sues about what factors the courts should consider when faced with claims
148. Id.
149. Stone, 804 So. 2d at 389.
150. Compare Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1091, with Stone v. CompuServe Interactive Servs.,
Inc., 804 So. 2d 383, 389 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
151. Stone, 804 So. 2d at 389.
152. Id.
153. See Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 439; Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v.
Dep't of Legal Affairs, 761 So. 2d 1256, 1262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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based upon the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act by non-
residents of the state.'56
IV. CONCLUSION: COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS DECISIONS
Both Glassman and Millennium held that the protection offered by the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act is available to consumers
who are not residents of the State of Florida.5 7 While the Third District
Court of Appeal in Millennium determined that the "offending conduct" or
practices must have occurred within the state in order for the FDUTPA to
provide a claim to injured persons, regardless of their residency status, other
decisions have relied on seemingly different factors.'58
In Glassman, the Fourth District Court of Appeal mentioned the deter-
mination by the Seventeenth Circuit Court that the "common injury" oc-
curred in Florida as one reason for allowing the application of the FDUTPA
to claims of out-of-state residents. 59 The Fourth District Court of Appeal,
however, applied a "significant contact" test as developed in Shutts to decide
the issue of whether common questions of law existed such that class certifi-
cation should have been granted. 60
Hutson seemed to consider both the "offending conduct", like in Mil-
lennium, and the "place of injury" as in Glassman, evidenced by the court's
statement that "[t]he alleged wrong was committed, and the damage done, at
the site of the sale of appellees' products."' 6' In Hutson, the court explained
156. See id. (determining that the alleged wrong took place in all fifty states, and so the
various states' laws should apply); Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438 (considering the "common
injury" took place in Florida and also applying a "significant contact" test to determine that
state interest was created, allowing the application of Florida law); Millennium, 761 So. 2d at
1262 (finding that the "offending conduct" occurred within the state by a Florida corporation,
and so the application of the FDUTPA was appropriate to claims made entirely by non-
residents of the state).
157. Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999); Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1262.
158. Compare Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1262, with Coastal Physician Servs. of Broward
County, Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding the availability of
the FDUTPA as a statutory basis for a consumer's claim is determined by whether the con-
sumer is a Florida resident), and Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438, 439-40 (noting that the com-
mon injury to all potential class members occurred in Florida, and holding that Florida had
sufficient contacts and state interest in the claims of the entire class, such that the application
of its law was proper to all potential class members, both residents and non-residents).
159. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438.
160. Id. at 439 (referring to Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19
(1985).
161. Hutson, 837 So. 2d at 1094.
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that it was using the place of sale to determine where the "wrong was com-
mitted" and the "damage done."' 62  In Glassman, a similar logic seems to
have been employed, as the site of the "common injury" was the place (Flor-
ida) where payment was made of the port charges in question. 63
But, in Millennium, the Third District Court of Appeal held that the "of-
fending conduct occurred entirely within this state" when the postcards in
question were mailed only to non-residents, and presumably received by
them solely outside of the state. 64 The offending conduct therefore, must
have been some act that Millennium performed prior to receipt by the non-
residents, as its operations were located within Florida.165 If the same analy-
sis were applied to Hutson, it would seem that marketing, manufacturing, or
other operations performed by Rexall Sundown, Inc. at their Florida business
location could have provided the source of "offending conduct" needed to
allow the FDUTPA to apply to the claims of non-residents in that case.
66
Perhaps, based upon the conflicting decisions between the various district
courts of appeal, the time may be ripe for certification to the Supreme Court
of Florida, or legislative amendments to the statute to determine what the
reach of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act should be in
relation to non-residents of the State of Florida.
67
162. Id.
163. Glassman, 738 So. 2d at 438.
164. Millennium Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Dep't of Legal Affairs, 761 So.
2d 1256, 1257, 1262 (emphasis added).
165. See id. at 1262.
166. See id.; Company Profile, Locations & Facilities, available at Corporate Website of
Rexall Sundown, Inc., http://www.rexallsundown.com/ pages/locations.aspx.
167. Compare Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1262 (finding that the "offending conduct" oc-
curred within the state by a Florida corporation, and so the application of the FDUTPA was
appropriate to claims made entirely by non-residents of the state), and Glassman, 738 So. 2d
at 439 (noting that the common injury to all potential class members occurred in Florida, and
holding that Florida had sufficient contacts and state interest in the claims of the entire class,
such that the application of its law was proper to non-residents), with Coastal Physician Servs.
of Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding the
availability of the FDUTPA as a statutory basis for a consumer's claim is determined by
whether the consumer is a Florida resident), and Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So. 2d
1090, 1094 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (determining that the alleged wrong took place in all
fifty states, and so the various states' laws should apply).
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